Managing Theatre and Cinema in Colonial India: Maurice E. Bandmann, J.F. Madan and the War Films’ Controversy by Balme, Christopher
6 
 
Popular Entertainment Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 6-21. ISSN 1837-9303 © 2015 The Author. Published by the School of 
Creative Arts, Faculty of Education & Arts, The University of Newcastle, Australia. 
 
 Christopher Balme 




Managing Theatre and Cinema 
in Colonial India: Maurice E. 
Bandmann, J.F. Madan and the 




The aim of this article is to investigate the highly unusual situation of direct state 
involvement in theatrical business activity in a colonial context and in particular 
the managerial activity involved. The central case study concerns the rivalry 
between two theatre and cinema managers active in India in the first decades of 
the 20th century, Maurice E. Bandmann and J. F. Madan and their remarkably 
parallel activities. In 1915 both were involved in a bidding war for a lucrative 
contract to distribute British government war films in India and the Far East. Both 
controlled theatrical and cinematic networks which the British government needed 
to access. The first part of the article discusses the importance of the new 
managerial and/or entrepreneurial function in theatre and cinema and proposes 
that one can speak of a ‘managerial turn’ in the period in question. The second part 
looks briefly at the two protagonists, Bandmann and Madan and then, how the 
narrative of the war films’ controversy played out in India and other countries. 
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nyone working in the area of colonial theatre in India learns very 
quickly that the voluminous holdings of the India Office held at the 
British Library and the National Archives of India in New Delhi are largely silent 
on theatre and entertainment. While colonial officials certainly monitored native 
theatre, and censorship practices were imposed in certain parts of India, but by 
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interest, if at all, only to municipal authorities. It was perceived as part of 
business activities and no Englishman or Indian for that matter was to be 
hindered in the pursuit of commerce, that divine right that made all men, and 
some women, equal before the law in the British Empire.1 Because of this quite 
literally laissez faire approach on the part of colonial authorities, it is remarkable 
when one finds not one but several files in the India Office directly concerned 
with not one but two theatrical and cinematic entrepreneurs, in this case 
Maurice E. Bandmann and J. F. Madan, the latter being one of the founders of the 
Indian film industry. The subject of the files is the distribution of war films 
during the First World War in partnership with His Majesty’s government. Both 
Bandmann and Madan competed for the business, with the former finally 
receiving what was to be a highly profitable contract. The key terms here are 
‘partnership,’ ‘bidding,’ ‘contract’ and, most egregiously of all, ‘profit.’  
 
The aim of this paper is twofold. I want to investigate the highly unusual 
situation of direct state involvement in theatrical business activity in a colonial 
context and in particular the managerial activity involved in this construction. I 
will proceed in three steps. Firstly, it is necessary to highlight the importance of 
the new managerial and/or entrepreneurial function in theatre and cinema and I 
shall propose that one can speak of a ‘managerial turn’ in the period in question. 
Secondly I will look briefly at the two protagonists, Bandmann and Madan and 
their remarkably parallel activities, which led to, thirdly, the war films’ 
controversy, the narrative of which I will attempt to reconstruct. 
 
The Managerial Turn 
 
Managing theatre and cinema in colonial India was a tricky business. To 
be clear about what we are dealing with here: theatre and cinema were first and 
foremost a business that operated under the benign laissez faire capitalist gaze of 
the British colonial administration. Its primary function was to generate profit 
for its owners, and managers had little interest in building a nation, decolonising 
the stage or cinema, or indeed in constructing—with wise foresight—a cultural 
heritage for future scholars to ponder on. More by chance than good intention 
they did all these things. Their role in this has been, however, largely overlooked. 
 
Defining theatrical management in the context here is not easy because 
the terms are unstable. Tracy Davis has referred to a “muddle of theatrical 
nomenclature” and provides what is, probably the first in-depth conceptual 
discussion of a set of often interchangeable terms: proprietor and patentee, 
‘lessee’ and ‘manager,’ impresario and entrepreneur.2 One could also add, in the 
current case, magnates. Whatever the activities, and there are important 
differences, they all fulfil a managerial function in some way.  
 
We can observe in the late-19th and early-20th century a ‘managerial turn’ 
in theatre and the entertainment industry. In order to study the reorganisation of 
theatrical entertainment in this period, particularly outside of the main 
metropolitan centres, we need a concept of managerialism to fully grasp the 
dynamics of theatrical production and reception. A notion of managerialism 
requires, however, that we distinguish heuristically managing from managers, 
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the complex set of tasks and activities from the persons carrying them out. The 
distinction can only be a heuristic one, because in practice, management in the 
new sense, was created by biographical persons whose actions contributed to 
the creation of the new concept. 
 
The locus classicus of this development is Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 
Principles of Scientific Management (1911), an analysis of ‘task’ management in 
order to improve efficiency in the workplace on the basis of ‘scientific’ principles 
in order to free management from the serendipity of relying on ‘some unusual or 
extraordinary man.’3 Although in theatre studies we tend to associate Taylorism, 
as it came to be called, somewhat eccentrically with Meyerhold’s biomechanics, 
Taylor’s own less than modest aims suggest very much an all encompassing shift 
or turn in modern life: 
 
the same principles can be applied with equal force to all social activities: 
to the management of our homes; the management of our farms; the 
manage-ment of the business of our tradesmen, large and small; of our 
churches, our philanthropic institutions, our universities, and our 
governmental departments.4 
 
To contextualise Taylor’s vision we need to look at the term management 
itself. The guru of management studies, Peter F. Drucker, claims for his object of 
study the status of a ‘pivotal event’ in the twentieth century and essentially 
confirms with hindsight what Taylor envisioned: the emergence of management 
in this (20th) century may have been a pivotal event of history. It signalled a 
major transformation of society into a pluralist ‘society of institutions,’ of which 
managements are the effective organs.5 Drucker argues that management—as 
opposed to managers—marks, in somewhat simplified terms, the transition from 
small-scale, family-centred enterprises, to large-scale organisations. Scale, 
complexity of tasks and the thereby induced necessity for problem solving 
generate the rise of management.6 
 
While theatre management is far from Taylor’s or Drucker’s minds it is, 
nevertheless, equally imbricated in these defining elements of modernity. 
Drawing on economic historian Alfred Chandler’s work,7 Tracy Davis points to 
the late-19th century roots of modern management in the theatre and theatre’s 
leading role in this development: “entertainment may be among the first sectors 
of the British economy to evince the organizational characteristics of centralized 
management and integrated production and distribution.”8 These organisational 
characteristics refer to multi-unit, modern corporations with simultaneous 
investment in manufacturing, marketing, and management.9 
 
Over and beyond the adoption or even pioneering of such techniques, the 
managerial turn means the perception of a distinct theatrical activity, often 
linked to a high profile personality, whose function was no longer primarily 
artistic in the sense of acting, singing, dancing or writing but whose name, 
whether personal or company, came to assume its own artistic dimension in the 
sense of standing for quality, genre etc. Managerial theatre is an early form of 
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theatrical branding.10 Theatre managers of the new type seldom ever bestrode 
the stages they managed yet they became as closely identified with them as any 
virtuosic actor: Max Reinhardt, George Edwardes, Diaghilev, J. C. Williamson, 
Isidore Schlesinger and, in our case study here, Maurice E. Bandmann, and J.F. 
Madan, all had brand recognition. 
 
As the name suggests, the actor-manager model associated with 19th 
century theatre, but which in fact has roots in the early modern period, 
highlights the double function of artistic and business activities in one and the 
same person whereby the brand recognition was directed at the artistic, not the 
business activity. The actor-manager in this sense could range from the highly 
capitalised operations of a Henry Irving and Herbert Beerbohm Tree to the 
myriad number of lesser to better known actors and their spouses who plied 
their trade with the help of a small number of usually underpaid actors, some of 
whom were recruited on site. Typically an itinerant actor-manager of the lesser 
or better known (rather than virtuosic) variety would acquire the rights to a 
certain repertoire (in as much as it was in copyright), hire a group of supporting 
performers and journey from venue to venue. They would rent the venue from a 
lessee or proprietor and then pocket the box office. This was a high-risk 
undertaking dependent on the play or the leading actor(s) to draw in an 
audience. Although such performers were labelled ‘managers,’ the term itself 
was used fairly loosely and was applied to “anyone connected with the business 
affairs of a traveling troupe.”11 Although some actor-managers such as Henry 
Irving or Sarah Bernhardt did become exceptionally wealthy, and some new 
managers became impecunious, the important distinction was not so much 
wealth as the separation of managerial activity from the artistic sphere. J. C. 
Williamson’s ‘firm’ could and did continue to operate long after its name-giver’s 
death. 
 
Victorian and particularly Edwardian theatre is replete with managerial 
theatre which replaced the small scale, often family-style operation, although the 
latter continued to exist. Management in this newer sense is linked more closely 
to entrepreneurialism than the task management described by Taylor. Looking 
beyond the U.K. and U.S. we find spectacular examples of managerial theatre 
which combined entrepreneurial elements of risk-taking, creative investment 
and planning, producing, as well the use of managers and management in the 
administrative sense to run highly dispersed organisations. The Australian 
producer J. C. Williamson, originally an American actor, created a theatrical 
empire in Australia that continued until 1976. The name J. C. Williamson meant 
control of venues (whether by lease or ownership), organisation of ‘product’ 
(touring artists and productions), innovative and aggressive publicity and the 
employment of mid-level site managers to administer local arrangements. 
Although Williamson died in 1913, his company, known simply as ‘The Firm,’ 
actually grew significantly under his successor, George Tallis (1869-1948), until 
it became the largest theatrical company in the world. The characterisation of 
Tallis in the Australian Dictionary of Biography provides a succinct summary of 
the new breed: “He was a born manager whose talents blended creative 
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Lesser known than J. C. Williamson but equally monopolistic in its 
approach was the South African-based African Theatres Trust, created by an 
insurance broker, Isidore Schlesinger (1871-1949). Schlesinger was born in New 
York into a Hungarian-Jewish family. He emigrated to South Africa aged 23 
where he sold insurance on the goldfields. In 1913 he began acquiring theatres 
and cinemas until he controlled most forms of performed and screened 
entertainment throughout South Africa including Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Amongst theatre managers Schlesinger was unusual in that he did not have a 
theatrical background. He is reputed to have said: “What do I know about 
theatres? I won’t buy any theatres unless I can control the whole theatrical 
business in South Africa, and put it on a decent business basis.”13 In effect, that is 
what he did, as well establishing a local film industry. 
 
We can summarise the structural characteristics of theatrical managerialism 
in the early twentieth century as following a set of shared principles: 
 
• Pluralism: theatre must be understood as spectacle and entertainment in the 
broadest sense: for this reason theatre and the new medium of cinema were 
not regarded as competing entertainment forms but rather as components of 
a varied assortment of products. In this period we must remember that 
cinema was just one element of a broad range of theatrical entertainments 
ranging from puppet shows to magicians, from musical comedy to drama, 
anything in fact that would fill a theatre. In this period, especially outside the 
main centres, theatre was in the truest sense of the word, a theatron, a place 
where one came to see. 
• Monopolism: New managerialism tended towards vertical and horizontal 
monopolism in terms of controlling as many levels of the production and 
distribution of a theatrical product as possible as well as the actual theatres 
themselves whether by purchase, lease or even construction of new venues. 
• Diversification and capitalisation: Common to most large-scale theatrical 
management was the creation of multiple, public companies traded on the 
stock market that not only do business with each other but also engage in 
non-theatrical business activities. The organisation as public companies 
ensured a much higher degree of capitalisation than even the most celebrated 
of traditional actor-managers could achieve.  
 
A Tale of Two Managers 
 
The managerial turn is characteristic of what can be termed early 
theatrical globalisation. By this term we mean a rapid expansion of theatrical 
infrastructure driven mainly by touring companies. Two theatrical managers 
competed on the highly lucrative Indian entertainment market: Maurice E. 
Bandmann, the Calcutta-based, undisputed king of ‘light’ theatrical 
entertainment, East of Suez, and J. F. Madan, the Parsi actor-turned-wine 
merchant-turned owner of the largest chain of theatres and cinemas in India in 
the first three decades of the 20th century. 
 
Between 1900-1922 the Anglo-American theatre manager Maurice E. 
Bandmann (1872-1922) established a theatrical empire that stretched from 
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Gibraltar to Japan. Bandmann was born in New York in 1872, the son of the 
famous German-Jewish tragedian, Daniel Bandmann and his second wife 
Millicent Bandmann-Palmer. After his parents separated, he was educated in 
England and Germany. Following in his parents’ footsteps, Maurice became an 
actor in England in the early 1890s playing alongside his mother. By the mid-
1890s he had already become proprietor of two theatrical companies known as 
the ‘North’ and the ‘South’ Manxmann Companies working the English provinces. 
As an actor he was best known for the roles Svengali in Trilby, Pete in The 
Manxman and as Marcus Superbus in The Sign of the Cross. In the late 1890s he 
began touring in the Mediterranean on a circuit that included Gibraltar, Malta, 
Alexandria and Cairo. Around the turn of the century he visited South America, 
the West Indies and Canada, and most importantly India. In 1905 he made 
Calcutta his headquarters and rapidly established a circuit, which by his own 
account took in “Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, India, Burmah, with the Malay States, the 
Straits Settlements, China, Japan, Java and Philippine Islands.”14 
 
Bandmann's activities were based around multiple touring companies 
that operated on a rotation system. In terms of scale, complexity and global reach, 
the Bandmann circuit, as it was known, was unrivalled in the theatre industry of 
the time.15 The name Maurice E. Bandmann stood for the presentation of 
professional large-scale productions of mainly musical comedy but also of 
Shakespeare, contemporary drama, vaudeville and even, on occasion, Grand 
Opera. As the sole possessor of the rights to the productions of George Edwardes 
and of the Gaiety Theatre in the British colonies, Bandmann became a purveyor 
of Edwardian theatre to the furthest flung reaches of the British Empire and 
beyond. While the colonial settlements were his main ports of call, they by no 
means limited his reach, which at different periods of an incessantly peripatetic 
career also included South America, the West Indies as well as Canada, the Dutch 
East Indies, the Philippines, China and Japan. 
 
A remarkable feature of the Bandmann enterprises was the fact that it 
was based not in London, from whence he drew his theatrical product, but in 
Calcutta, where he built a new theatre in 1908, The Empire. As well as theatrical 
entertainment Bandmann also established a cinema business by introducing and 
distributing films, including the new Kinemacolor technology, an early form of 
stereoscopic and colour film. His business activities reached a peak in 1919 when 
he controlled two public companies, Bandman Varieties Ltd and Bandman 
Eastern Circuit, which managed different aspects of his enterprises. 
 
On his premature death in 1922 the many obituaries emphasised his 
considerable impact and importance for the establishment of high quality 
theatrical entertainment throughout the region. His name as much or even more 
than his performers came to be recognised by his audiences as a trademark, a 
“guinea stamp among itinerant theatrical circles.” 16 In this sense he can be 
compared to J. C. Williamson or the American syndicate managers such as the 
Shubert Brothers or Marc Klaw and Abraham Erlanger. The name Bandmann had 
such high brand recognition that the Dunlop Tyre Company used him to endorse 
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Originally from Bombay, the Parsi entrepreneur J. F. (Jamsetji Framji) 
Madan (1856–1923) had begun as an actor in Parsi theatre in his home city but 
later established himself as a merchant supplying the British army with wine and 
other provisions. This formed the basis of his fortune with which he began to 
acquire theatres. In 1902 he relocated to Calcutta at almost exactly the same time 
as Bandmann where he founded J. F. Madan and Sons. He bought the Corinthian 
Theatre, founded the Elphinstone Bioscope Company and began showing films in 
tents on the Maidan before opening the first dedicated movie house in Calcutta, 
the Elphinstone Picture Palace. From there he acquired theatres all over India, 
became an agent for Pathé and also began producing films. In 1917 his company 
Madan’s Far Eastern Films joined forces with Bandmann to form the Excelsior 
Cinematograph Syndicate dedicated to distributing films as well as owning and 
managing a chain of cinemas. In 1919 Madan, like Bandmann, floated a public 
company, Madan Theatres Ltd, which incorporated the other companies.18 It was 
this company that formed the basis of the remarkable growth of the Madan 
empire. By issuing shares and generating a much broader capital base, Madan 
was able to embark on a large-scale program of buying up theatre houses as well 
as distributing and producing films, both foreign and Indian. Using an initial 
capital of 100 lakhs of rupees (the equivalent of 10 million rupees) Madan 
acquired cinemas not just in India but also in Ceylon and Burma. 
 
Bandmann and Madan were both competitors and partners, although 
after the First World War cooperation dominated. The two companies 
specialised: Bandmann provided a high quality theatrical product which was 
shown in theatres owned by Madan. The theatrical side of this collaboration 
broke down gradually after Bandmann’s death when the supply began to 
decrease, as the Bandmann Eastern Circuit began itself to focus increasingly on 
cinema and became thus a competitor for the Madan companies. At its height, 
Madan’s business reputedly controlled over 100 cinema houses and theatres 
throughout the Indian subcontinent as well as all levels of production and 
distribution, including even editing and later sound recording equipment. This 
virtual monopoly generated, not surprisingly, severe criticism and in the famous 
Report of the Indian Cinematographic Committee of 1926-27, Madan’s operations, 
now controlled by his son, J. J. Madan, came in for particular scrutiny.19  
 
The War Films War 
 
A few years earlier, relations had not been so amicable.20 In 1915 the war 
was not going well for Britain: troops were bogged down in France and Gallipoli. 
It was decided to open a new front: propaganda, also by cinematic means.21 The 
office in charge of overseas propaganda, situated at Wellington House, was a 
covert operation run by Charles Masterman, and aided by Ernest Gowers, who 
was in charge of the cinematic division. In 1915 the decision was taken to 
produce an openly propagandistic film, entitled Britain Prepared. Sponsored 
openly by the Admiralty and the War Office and covertly by Wellington House, 
production was entrusted to Jury’s Imperial Pictures and Kineto, under the 
supervision of the American-born film producer Charles Urban. It was decided to 
exhibit the film as widely as possible including the Indian subcontinent and the 
Far East. Gowers was entrusted with the task of finding a suitable distributor, 
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and he soon turned to Bandmann. Before he received a reply from Bandmann, he 
was contacted by Madan who had already applied for permission to exhibit the 
film via an agent in England. Thus began a bidding war for the right to distribute 
the first British propaganda film. 
 
In the ensuing correspondence that is well documented in files held by the 
India office and the National archives of India, we should remember that the 
centre of operations, Wellington house, did not ‘exist.’ It was a secret operation 
that was—somewhat paradoxically—entrusted with the task of organising 
highly public events, the exhibition of cinematic propaganda. Over a period of 
about a year we can trace a rivalry between Bandmann and Madan as both 
lobbied for what was obviously a lucrative contract in a monopolistic market. 
The home and political department of the government of India first mentions the 
case in a letter from Gowers, to the India Office, dated 12th of April 1916. 
 
The present position is that the Cinema committee are anxious to await 
the arrival in England of someone who is now on his way here, who is 
anxious to secure the films, not only for India but for the whole of the far 
east, and we agreed that in the circumstances they might do so.22 
 
This person appears to be an agent sent by Madan, although it may also have 
been from Bandmann, who had also dispatched an agent. In a memorandum 
from 13th of June 1916, the India Office reported via the government of Bengal 
that Madan was still unable to obtain permission to exhibit the film and that he 
urgently required clarification: 
 
The position is that the government of Bengal informed us that Madan & 
Co. are willing and anxious to obtain the film “Britain Prepared” that a 
portion of the film had already been purchased for Madan but they were 
prohibited from exhibiting the film by the home government. We then 
telegraphed to the Secretary of State asking that the agents of Madan be 
granted permission to purchase and exhibit the film in India.23 
 
In a letter dated 26th of May 1916 Gowers ‘clarified’ an extremely 
‘abstruse’ situation, as he had to admit, and reported that, in short, the contract 
had been awarded to Bandmann:  
 
Mr. Bandman will have the exclusive right of showing the film “Britain 
Prepared” in India. It cannot be placed or effectively shown on any other 
terms than exclusive terms. It is not the case that Mr. Madan procured 
part of the film or that the exhibition was ever prohibited by the home 
Government. What happened was this. Owing to the desire of the war 
office to keep the display in this country and the colonies of “Films from 
the Front” in their own hands, there is a complicated arrangement by 
which these films are dealt with in these countries by a different body 
(called the “Topical Committee”) from our “Cinema Committee” which 
deals with these films in allied and neutral countries and with the film 
“Britain Prepared” (as distinct from the films from the Front) in this 
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country and elsewhere. The Topical Committee, apparently forgetful of 
the fact that India was not a colony, sent out one of the films from the 
Front to Mr. Madan, and we hope to be able to please all parties by giving 
“Britain Prepared”(with a few films from the Front substituted for the 
Army training in this country) to Mr. Bandman, and subsequently 
negotiating with Mr. Madan for the display of a collection of other Films 
from the Front. This sounds very abstruse, but I have made it as clear as I 
can. Anyhow, I have every hope that the result will be that everybody will 
be pleased and the films will have an effective show. There seems to be no 
doubt, on the whole, that Bandman can handle the films more effectively 
than Madan.24 
 
As it transpired, Bandmann obtained a virtual monopoly on all films 
produced under the supervision of Wellington House. While it was 
acknowledged that Madan had the larger distribution network on the Indian 
subcontinent, Bandmann's operations extended all the way to Japan and it 
became clear that the exhibition of Britain Prepared as well as other films such as 
the Battle of the Somme, should have as wide a distribution as possible and the 
Bandmann theatrical circuit ensured this. 
 
In the official agreement between the Cinema committee and Bandmann 
the question of distribution was an integral part of the contract. It laid out an 
exact itinerary of exhibition, stipulating wherever possible the actual theatres 
and cinemas to be used. The financial conditions were also extremely 
advantageous for Bandmann. The agreement stated that the Cinema committee:  
 
shall provide without charge as many sets of positive films as the licensee 
can advantageously manage and control (not exceeding four). The Cinema 
committee shall furnish the licensee with such further films (hereinafter 
called “the new films”) as they shall in the discretion think fit and the new 
films shall thereupon be included in the program and shall be in 
substitution for such films of the original programme as may be agreed.25  
 
These so-called ‘new films meant in effect a monopoly on other propaganda films 
still to be produced. The agreement also allowed Bandmann to retain almost 
70% of total gross receipts. The Cinema committee was extremely anxious that 
the film Britain Prepared receive the utmost publicity and for this reason its 
premiere in Shimla was timed so that the Viceroy was present. There is also 
correspondence with the British Embassy in Tokyo to ensure that a command 
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Figure 1. Bandmann’s letterhead advertising and documenting his monopoly on the British ‘Official 
War Films.’ Source: NAI, Home Department 1916. Part B. nos. 416 – 420. 
 
To manage this new lucrative business in war propaganda, Bandman, who 
had by now dropped the second ‘n’ in his name, set up a new company dedicated 
to marketing and distributing the official war films. The letterhead (Fig.1) 
declares him to be “sole director for India and the East.” Indeed, the Maurice 
Bandman War Films became a well-known fixture on the cinematic circuit of 
India and the Far East. The exhibition was accompanied by generous advertising 
space in the local papers, much greater then he usually employed for his 
theatrical tours. An advertisement for the Battle of the Somme, the next, and film-
historically speaking, the most famous of the war films, conveys an accurate idea 
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Figure 2. Advertisement for The Battle of the Somme, in Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 8 
November 1916, 8. 
 
This “great War sermon,” employs the common euphemistic term “the big 
push” to characterise what is now considered to be the greatest disaster in 
British military history with the loss of 20,000 men killed on the first day. This 
film has been much analysed in recent years, especially in terms of its 
problematic authenticity in depicting battle scenes (mentioned explicitly in the 
advertisement). It is now accepted that some of these scenes were staged and 
filmed well away from the battlefield, although most of the footage was indeed 
filmed in the immediate vicinity of the Somme.26 The advertisement is also a rich 
text in its own right containing a plethora of information and rhetorical devices 
including options in terms of reception: “war in all its heroism, all its hideous 
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Figure 3. Advertisement for The Battle of the Ancre, The Empire, 24 April 1917, 4. 
 
Advertising for the next film to be exhibited, The Battle of the Ancre (Fig. 
3), superseded the Battle of the Somme in terms of its pictorial and textual 
richness. The text accompanying the images was clearly written by the 
propaganda department and engages with the previous film's reception (it had 
been too graphic in its depiction of war and evidently questions had been raised 
about its authentic depiction of battle). It includes a note that reads: “The British 
General headquarters is responsible for the censorship of these films and allows 
nothing in the nature of a ‘fake’ to be shown. The pictures are authentic and 
taken on the battlefield.” The film depicted a later phase of the battle of the 
Somme, which lasted from July to November 1916. A review in The Statesman, 
the Calcutta-based national daily, praised the relative restraint: “there is less 
evidence of the horrors of the grim struggle now in progress” and highlighted the 
“appearance of the ‘tanks,’ these wonderful engines of destruction which … are 
leading our troops to victory and mowing down the German defences.”27 
 
The triumphant and no doubt commercially lucrative progress of the 
Bandmann War Films did not pass without critical notice along the itinerary of 
his tours between Bombay and Tokyo. On 9 January 1917 The Straits Times in 
Singapore carried a report outlining not only Bandmann’s newest theatrical 
offerings—his acquisition of “the exclusive rights of a large and wonderful 
repertoire of the latest London successes with which to enliven theatre-goers in 
1917”—but also a new undertaking:  
 
Another enterprise is connected with films, and the Bandmann Film 
Control is being formed to supply picture theatre managers throughout 
India and the Far East with all British films. This is in addition to the 
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Government pictures Britain Prepared and The Battle of the Somme, 
practically the whole profits of which go to military charities.28 
 
The key word here is ‘practically’ because, as we have seen from the agreement, 
almost 70% of gross receipts went to Bandmann, while 33% went to the Cinema 
committee, which did indeed denote its profit to war charities. This somewhat 
murky financial arrangement did not go unnoticed. A month later, the same 
paper reproduced an article from The Peking and Tientsin Times in which the 
whole question of distribution of propaganda for personal profit was criticised. 
The author compares the German practice of actually paying for their war films 
to be exhibited: “They did not bargain for ninety percent of the receipts 
wherever their films were shown. In Tientsin they were willing to pay $2,000 for 
the use of a theatre in the Chinese City for two weeks, besides allowing the 
proprietor the benefit of all receipts at the door.” He complains that the British 
war films have not been shown in Tientsin or anywhere in North China. The 
reason for this neglect is, he argues, obvious:  
 
The exclusive rights of exhibiting each series have been granted, upon hat 
terms, we are not in a position to state, to Mr. Maurice E. Bandmann, who 
is following the natural course of a man enjoying so valuable a concession, 
of showing them where and when he can obtain the best financial results 
… we are constrained to ask whether it was wise of the British authorities, 
in any case, to part with the exclusive rights in such valuable and inspiring 
films to an individual in the theatrical business (emphasis added, C.B.).29 
 
The contrast between a profit-driven English theatrical business model 
and ‘stupid German money,’ i.e. state-supported distribution, could not be clearer 
and marks a fundamental difference between the two countries, even allowing 
for the special case of propaganda which is produced in the first instance to 
“produce most moral effect.”30 In fact, Tsientin and Peking were expressly 
included in the original agreement for Britain Prepares and as Bandmann 
frequently visited these cities with his theatre companies, there was no reason 




After the end of the First World War the equilibrium of theatrical and 
cinematic entertainment shifted significantly as the business of touring live 
theatre became less profitable. This was due to several factors. The rise of 
cinema meant competition on the entertainment market that forced troupes to 
charge ticket prices that were little more than the cinema. Advertisements on the 
amusements pages of the local Bombay or Calcutta newspapers show an 
overwhelming preponderance of films, while a Bandmann troupe provided the 
only professional theatrical shows on offer. In 1920 The Times of India analysed 
the situation in terms of ticket prices that had remained unchanged for a decade 
while the travelling expenses of a theatrical company had doubled compared to 
before the war. This pressure on costs combined with a drop in audiences led to 
a dearth of high quality theatre. The article compares the less than 200 
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spectators at the 1200-seat Bombay Opera House (built by Bandmann in 1912 
but relinquished by him to his co-owner, J. F. Karaka) to the full houses at the 
smaller but more expensive Excelsior Theatre (owned by Madan and used by 
Bandmann on his visits to Bombay).31 For Bandmann, the solution was to join 
forces with Madan by gaining access to his chain of theatres at reasonable prices; 
for Madan, Bandmann’s theatre companies offered additional revenue and 
perhaps a sachet of cultural respectability that his cinematic offerings certainly 
did not have.32 In fact cinema was becoming a ‘problem’ in the eyes of colonial 
authorities and the morally uprighteous, owing to the importation of cheap 
American product, especially Westerns, and their problematic representation of 
race. The English trade paper The Bioscope carried an article in 1921 entitled 
“Films in India” which adumbrated the problem: “It must be obvious that films 
showing acts of violence on white women by Mexicans and such-like films are 
highly dangerous.”33 The article reprised what was an on-going public debate in 
India on the dangers of cinema and the need for censorship, which resulted in 
the implementation of a committee of inquiry whose report, published in 1928, 




In an era predating state subsidy, theatre and cinema needed to be traded 
for a profit and they could be highly profitable. Bandmann certainly made a 
modest fortune, Madan an even greater one, while J. C. Williamson died a multi-
millionaire (in today’s currency). I have only analysed one small part of each 
manager’s activities. The War Films were for Madan an opportunity lost, for 
Bandmann a lucrative one gained. This case provides insight into the mechanics 
and dynamics of theatrical entrepreneurship under the special circumstances of 
wartime propaganda. In the context of imperial politics theatrical management 
needs to be understood not as a mere administrative task but as perhaps the 
most important activity in a complex actor-network linking covert wartime 
propaganda, entrepreneurial vision, existing distribution networks, marketing 
strategies and fundamental unease about ‘theatrical business’ in a time of war. If 
we review the three categories defining theatrical managerialism in the early 
twentieth century—pluralism, monopolism, and diversification—then we can 
find both confirmation and modification of the three concepts. Pluralism was 
inherent in the theatre business: outside the metropolitan centres, managers 
such as Bandmann traded in spectacle ranging from puppet shows to cinema. 
Bandmann’s success in obtaining the war film contract was determined largely 
by his pre-existing theatrical circuit on which he showed anything. The 
monopolistic tendencies of his war film operation eponymously named the 
Bandman Film Control was not of his own devising but certainly in his interest, 
but its operation went directly against the principles of free trade and 
competition. But all the large-scale theatre managers operating ‘abroad’ 
attempted to establish monopolies and they were largely successful. 
Diversification meant creating groups of companies under one controlling figure: 
in this respect Bandmann and Madan resembled each other with their own 
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The managerial turn lives on in the sector of commercial theatre in a few 
metropolitan centres. Generally speaking, it was replaced by artistic directors in 
subsidised theatres managing pre-existing budgets. In an age of the performative 
turn, the managerial turn of the previous century seems strangely familiar: 
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